In recent
years, the Angolan financial market has been led by Banco Africano de
Investimentos – BAI (African Investment Bank), a banking institution previously
named Banco Angolano de Investimentos (Angolan Investment Bank). To a certain
extent, the shareholding structure of the bank reflects its success as well as
the institutionalization of public assets’ transfer to public officials, for
their illicit enrichment.
Praised at
US $8 billion, BAI currently holds a portfolio of deposits and credits
estimated, by the Angolan National Bank, at US $10.4 billion and US $3.2
billion, respectively.
At its
inception, in 1996, Sonangol was BAI’s main investor, with 18.5 percent of its
shares. Over the years, Sonangol quietly transferred 10 percent of its shares
to the private ownership of high-ranking officials, besides the ones who, from
the start, already owned considerable shares of the banks stock.
By way of
illustration, the table below shows only the list of beneficiaries who, by the
time they became shareholders of the bank, already held public office posts and
who continue to hold positions in the government or in public administration.
Left out of the list are individuals who became shareholders of the bank while
in public office, but are currently engaged just in private business. This is
the case of general João Baptista de Matos (2.5 percent) who, at the time, was
Chief of the General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces.
Altogether,
identified public officials and former colleagues hold a total of 47.75 percent
of BAI’s shares. Meanwhile, 42.25 percent is distributed among private Angolan
companies associated with public officials, foreign and national managers of
the bank, as well as foreign companies such as the Portuguese constructor Mota.
Sonangol retains 8.50 of the shares, while the state-owned diamond company
Endiama keeps 1.50 of BAI’s shares.
In 2010,
the United States Senate investigated BAI’s operations in that country, on
suspicion that the bank was operating as a money laundering vehicle at the
service of senior Angolan officials. The investigation publicly revealed the
transfer of BAI’s shares to certain high-ranking political figures.
According
to the Senate’s
report, BAI had requested HSBC to maintain confidentiality on the identity of
the owners of Dabas Management, José Castro Paiva, and of ABL, Manuel Vicente,
to allow “some privacy in relation to this investment.” But in fact, the
intention of the confidentiality request was to conceal a crime of
embezzlement. Manuel Vicente (Sonangol’s chair and CEO at the time) and José
Paiva (Sonangol U.K chairman of the board) used their positions, while setting
up the bank, to transfer a total of 10 percent of the bank’s shares, from the
outset, to their private ownership.
With
respect to Arcinella Assets and Sforza Properties, respectively registered in
the Bahamas and in the British Virgin Islands, BAI provided contradictory
information, according to the Senate report. As a way to avoid revealing the
true identity of the shareholders, BAI declared that 13.5 percent of the
shares, jointly held by the two companies, had been placed under the temporary
ownership of José Carlos Paiva. He would hold them on a custodial basis, in his
role as chairman of BAI. The bank further informed that, according to its
strategy and that of Sonangol (its main shareholder), the shares would be
transferred to “private individuals over time as they are able to generate
wealth.” According to BAI, the individuals who would receive the shares were to
be “of Angolan nationality,” with none to receive more than one percent of
either special vehicle purpose company.
Moreover,
Sakus – Empreendimentos e Participações S.A, a company that holds 3.6 percent
of BAI’s capital, is run by Manuel Vicente’s stepson, Mirco de Jesus Martins,
who is also his representative in many of his business dealings. This company
was set up in 2005 by a Sonangol officer, Norberto Marcolino but, in 2007, new
partners, represented by Mr. Martins took it over as an anonymous society
(S.A).
The way
BAI has explained the transfer of public assets to the private ownership of the
Angolan elite is interesting. Its main reasoning is that BAI was created to
facilitate the emergence of a national middle class, capable of controlling and
developing the Angolan financial sector.
As a
legitimizing example, BAI’s representatives have pointed out to the Black
Economic Empowerment program in South Africa. This was a project created in
1994 by the ANC government as a legislative measure to correct the inequalities
inherited from Apartheid. The program aimed to give economic opportunities to
previously disadvantaged groups, such as blacks, coloureds, Indians and some
Chinese. Besides promoting the participation in business creation and
management, the program includes other initiatives aimed at improving the full
economic and social integration of the country.
In a
recent document accessed by the author, representatives of the bank also
pointed out that war was an obstacle for any structural policy to be set in
place. Therefore, BAI had to “take such a forward looking measure towards
economic empowerment, even in the absence of a national program and national
laws.”
There is,
however, a very important element that differentiates the South African process
from the Angolan case. Since Angola’s independence, both the political and
economic power has been concentrated in the hands of a limited group of MPLA
and government leaders. What changed, once the official Marxist-Leninist
doctrine was abandoned in 1991, was simply a formality that transferred the
control of the economy from the state to private hands, who are the same of
government officials and their families.
For
instance, in December 2010, just after the release of the Senate report, the
Portuguese construction company Soares da Costa sold the three percent of
shares it held at BAI to two Angolan private companies for US $27.7 million,
but kept the identity of the buyers as a kind of state secret. These buyers are
probably top government officials. Otherwise there would be no reason for such
secrecy in a regular business deal.
BAI’s
“empowerment” program is but a clear money laundering scheme. It introduces into
the national and international banking systems assets diverted from public
coffers for the private benefit of MPLA leaders and government officials, who
are liable for crimes of corruption because of the plunder of the country’s
resources. The Law against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing establishes
that both the participation and the facilitation of acts of traffic of
influence are crimes of money laundering (Art. 51, 1). The law is also specific
on the conversion and transfer of ill-gotten gains obtained directly or
indirectly (Art. 51, 2), as is the case of share percentages transferred from
Sonangol to Angolan officials.
BAI’s
growth is due to the relationship it maintains with the state, the main
shareholder and debtor of the bank. In fact, many of Sonangol’s financial
operations are conducted through BAI. Last March, the state-owned oil company
requested BAI to lead a bank syndicate from which to obtain a $600 million
loan.
In 2007,
BAI lead a syndicate of banks that loaned more than one billion dollars to the
Angolan government. In 2008 BAI lent US $400 million to the government,
according to public records, while Sonangol obtained a loan of US $150 million
from the bank. In the following year, BAI issued credit to the government’s
worth US $375 million.
International
Respectability
Despite
its deeply corrupt nature, BAI enjoys international respectability as it
created, together with European institutions, the Angolan Private Investment
Fund (Fundo de Investimento Privado de Angola). BAI’s partners include the
European Bank of Investments (established by the European Union), the Norwegian
Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund), the Danish Fund for International
Investment (IFU), the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, as well
as Banco Atlântico, in which Sonangol is also the main shareholder. The Angolan
Private Investment Fund is administered by Angola Capital Partners, a private
equity fund owned in equal parts by Norfund and BAI.
As a
general rule, the Angolan government enjoys great complicity from the European
Union and Nordic countries, which refrain from addressing publicly the
situation of generalized corruption, democratic deficit and human rights’
abuses in Angola.
Angolans
need to know about the type of detergents their government officials use, both
in BAI and in other banks, to launder so much money stolen from the Angolan
people. How can citizens, vested of their sovereign rights, claim back the
assets that belong to them and demand justice? That is the question.
http://makaangola.org/2012/06/bai-a-lavandaria-do-regime/?lang=en
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